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RECENT BOOKS
BooK REvmws
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.*

3

VoLs. By Charles Alan Wright. St. Paul, Minn.: West. 1969. $60.
Review I
Professor Wright's new three-volume treatise on federal criminal
practice and procedure is a much needed successor to the one-volume
work of Professor William W. Barron published in 1951.1 Since
then, revisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the new
Federal Appellate Rules, the enormous increase in decisional law,
and the recent enactment of numerous statutes have made compilation of a comprehensive new treatise mandatory. The farreaching developments in federal criminal procedure-particularly
the requirements for appointment of counsel-mean that many
lawyers must now educate themselves in the intricacies of the federal criminal justice system. Even those who may think they are at
home in that system probably need the refresher course which a
reading of these three volumes provides. Fortunately, Professor
Wright has an easy style and he gives the reader something to look
for by expressing his mvn opinions about matters both settled and
unsettled. By following the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
in numerical order the author has provided a double index system
and, although many of the more important subjects are not explicitly covered in the rules, the scheme does provide a logical place for
everything. However, since the work covers a rapidly developing
field of law, and since there are sharp divisions of opinion regarding
many aspects of criminal procedure, any reader is bound to find
statements and methods of treatment with which he could take
issue.
In his discussion of rule 5, the provision requiring that the arrested person be taken before a magistrate "without unnecessary
delay," Professor Wright reviews Miranda v. Arizona2 and its young
progeny which require exclusion of confessions or admissions made
while in custody, unless a four-part warning has been given and a
proper waiver of rights has been shmvn. Thus, the application of
Miranda will frequently turn on whether the defendant was "in
custody" at the crucial time. The cases cited would be more helpful
• These three books are the first volumes in a new treatise on the Federal Rules of
Criminal, Civil, and Appellate Procedure. The civil rules will be covered by Professor
Wright and Professor Arthur R. Miller of the University of Michigan Law School. The
appellate rules will be treated by Professor Wright and Eugene Gressman of the District
of Columbia Bar.-Ed.
1. 4 W. BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1951).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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if the footnote summaries noted more exactly the surroundings of
the defendant at the time of the interview by authorities; for example, was the defendant in his own office? Also, the courts have apparently been more ready to find the element of compulsion lacking
when FBI agents have done the interviewing.
I do not agree with Professor Wright that the Supreme Court
will necessarily exclude the fruits of every statement found to have
been taken in violation of Miranda. If the fruit is a kidnapped
child, a dead body, or stolen bonds, it would seem to be carrying
logic beyond all good reason to exclude such evidence, even if the
defendant's admissions could not be received in evidence. In practice, I think that within the next few years the courts, with the
help of such studies as the American Law Institute proposals for a
pre-arraignment code, will find ways to modify the consequences of
.Miranda and perhaps even to permit some relaxation of its requirements in the discretion of the trial judges. Of course the
Supreme Court could do this much more effectively by use of its
rulemaking power than by piecemeal case-by-case adjudication.
The subject of discovery is rightly given much space. Professor
Wright points out that the rule 5 provisions for preliminary examination before the United States Commissioner ("Magistrate" under
the 1968 Federal Magistrates Act3) were not meant to be the means
of affording discovery. 4 This fact seems clear from the function
of grand juries in the federal system and from the detailed provisions of rule 16. I agree with the author that increased discovery
should be by "carefully considered amendment of the rules, rather
than by a novel construction of the existing rule" (vol. I, pp. 13940), meaning rule 5. It is true that in England the preliminary
hearing is the primary means of discovery, 5 especially since the
Crown must produce substantially all its important evidence at the
hearing. But even in England this has created problems of prejudicial publicity, and such difficulties would be infinitely harder to
control here. In addition, the danger of intimidating witnesses and
the risks attendant upon greater delay in bringing cases to trial
would make such a requirement unwise in the United States.
Professor "Wright is accurate in saying that there is a distinct trend
toward broad discovery. It is clearly in the interest of the prosecution-as well as of the defense-to inform the defense of the factual
basis for the prosecution. In many cases this leads to earlier disposition by way of plea settlements, especially since defense counsel usually receives more accurate and complete information in this way
l!. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (Oct. 17, 1968) (codified in 18, 28 U.S.C.).
4. See Weinberg &: 'Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation To Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67
MICH. L. REv. ll!61, 1390-9!! (1969).
5. D, KARLEN, ANGLO-A.Ml!RICAN CRn.ilNAL JUSTICE 158-61, 165-66 (1967).
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than his client is willing or able to give him. Moreover, full disclosure makes for fairer trials and minimizes the possibility of post-conviction complaints. The main argument for strictly limited disclosure has been that, since many defense counsel are not to be trusted,
perjury and intimidation will result from full disclosure. Now that
many more attorneys are defending criminal cases by assignment,
however, there should be a steady and noticeable improvement in
the standards and practices of lawyers representing criminal defendants. If the trial courts are given the power, in appropriate
cases, to allow discovery only at stated times and on certain conditions, it seems that broader discovery in the great majority of cases
would be highly desirable.
With respect to pleas of guilty, Professor Wright points out the
undesirability of permitting a defendant to plead without counsel.
In my opinion, recent case law and the enormous increase in the
number of habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners on this point
underline the importance of never permitting a defendant to plead
or stand trial without having an attorney present to advise and assist
him, regardless of what the defendc\.nt may wish. Moreover, la'wyers
defending criminal cases must also be prepared to defend their advice and their performance at some later date in one or more postconviction proceedings. Thus, under recent decisions, the case of
client against lawyer has been built into every criminal proceeding
in which the result is anything short of acquittal or dismissal. Still,
the trial court must do what it can to protect its judgments, and the
least it can do is to require lawyers to attend every case no matter
how up.pleasant and profitless that task may be.
In his discussion of waiver of jury trial, Professor Wright notes
a 1930 Supreme Court case, 6 apparently with approval, for the proposition that trial by jury is the preferable mode of disposing of fact
issues ju ijerio1-1s qiJninal cases. While a footnote cites some figµres
for 1964 and 1965 indicating waiver of juries in thirty per cent of
criminal trials (vol. 2, p. 8 n.18), the trend is even more pronounced now. In the Southern Dfatrict of New York, defendants
presently waive a jury in one half of the criminal cases that are tried.
Since the Government and the trial judge must also consent to dispensing with a jury, it seems that ideas of what is preferable have
undergone considerable change.
Professor Wright questions the constitutionality of the 1966
amendment to rule 25, which provides that if the judge presiding
at a jury trial is unable to procee:d, another judge may be assigned
to finish the trial upon certifying that he has familiarized himself
·with the record. Professor Wright thinks that unless the defendant
consents, a mistrial should result. At the same time he does not ques6. Patton v. Upia:d States, 281 U.S. 276 (19110).
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tion. the provision allowing another judge to take OYet after the vetdict.1 If another judge can act to impose sentence and pass on all
motions after verdict, I see no good teason why he cannot substitute
during the trial. Of course if the circumstances make such substitution inadvisable, the substituted judge could declare a mistrial, but
in most cases substitution would be feasible and desirable.
The admissibility of confessions ahd identification evidence and
claims of illegal search and seizure, which the Supreme Court dealt
with in Miranda, Jackson 11. Denno,8 and United States 11. Wade, 9
now take up considerable time of the trial courts irt hearing motions to suppress. I think practicing lawyers will be somewhat disappointed by the absence of a guide ot form £or the motion papers
which should be filed before trial wherever possible. Moreover, it
would be helpful to refer to the provisions of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196810 regarding motions to suppress.
Professor Wright points out that in Simmons v. United States, 11
the Court held that the accused does not, by testifying at an eviderttiary hearing, subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues
in the case, and that his testimony is not admissible against him at
trial on the issue of guilt, although it may be used to impeach him
if he later testifies inconsistently at the trial. 12 Thus, in most cases
there should be no reason hot to call the defendant in order to
support a motion to suppress. The Simmons holding has been htcorporated in the Preliminary Draft of Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, circulated i11 March
1969 by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference. Undoubtedly Professor Wright's first set of
supplementary pocket parts will make liberal use of tnany of these
proposed rules and the supporting commentary.
It is gratifying to find Professor Wright quoting generously from
the numerous proposed standards issued by the American Bar Association on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. But I think
it would have been helpful to include more references to the Pleas
of Guilty standards which, in paragraph 1.8, state the reasons why
the sentencing court may give more lenient sentences to those who
plead guilty.
Section 350I(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 196813 requires that when a motion is made to suppress a con7. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(b).
8. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
9. 388 U.S. 218 (1968).
10. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (Julie 19, 1968). See, in particu1ar, title III,
§ 2518(10)(a) and title VIII, § 1301.
11. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
12. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
13. 18 U.S.C.A. § 350l(a) (1969).
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fession on the ground that it was not voluntary, the trial judge, sitting without a jury, shall first determine the issue of voluntariness.
In discussing this provision, Professor Wright states that the judge
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession is voluntary before he admits it. I find no basis for requiring that the judge
must make such a finding. The statute does not say this, nor, so far as
I know, is such a test required for any preliminary ruling on matters
which are evidentiary. The only authority cited is a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,14 but I
doubt that any other federal circuit would agree with the District
of Columbia Circuit on the point.
In commenting on the Supreme Court decisions on electronic
surveillance, Professor Wright expresses the view that the decisions
in Katz v. United States15 and Berger v. New York 16 seem to limit
the use of recording devices by informers. I do not agree. Although the Seventh Circuit appears to share Professor Wright's interpretation,17 the Second Circuit recently held that the use of recording devices by informers is not banned by the Supreme Court's
earlier decisions.18 To my mind, Katz and Berger, which involved
electronic surveillance performed without the knowledge of any of
the participants in the intercepted conversations, have no application to cases such as White and Kaufer, in which a conversation is
recorded with the consent of one of the parties and the recording
merely serves to preserve the consenting party's recollection. In any
event, this question is likely to be settled soon, since the Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari in the White case.19
Admissions to bail before trial and even after trial have become
greatly important in the United States because of the longer delays in trying more cases and the inordinate time required to dispose of an increased number of appeals. Not until we are equipped
to dispose summarily of frivolous appeals and to expedite all other
appeals by appropriate supervision by the appellate courts themselves will we be able to move the appellate traffic with suitable
speed. The mere promulgation of rules is futile; there must be a
rule for each case, depending on its peculiar circumstances, imposed
by the court and enforced by appropriate sanctions.
With respect to appointment of counsel under the Criminal Justice Act,20 the author fails to point out that no allowance may be
14. Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354, 357 n.7, 362, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 995
(1967).
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
17. See United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969).
18. See United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.), afj'd on other grounds, 394
U.S. 458 (1968) (per curiam).
19. 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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made under the Act for work done on appeals unless an order of
appointment of the court of appeals has been made prior to the
performance of services for which claim is made. Of course the statute should be amended to allow compensation which at least approximates the cost of services rendered. As it is, counsel almost
always are paid far less than the value of their services, and even
low-cost, well-organized services such as the Legal Aid Society of
New York lose money on every appeal handled.
Professor Wright includes one reference which I think would
have been better omitted. In Volume l, he quotes Dean Pye to support the view that criminal procedures give overwhelming advantage to the prosecution (p. 498). The Dean attempts to demonstrate
the illusory nature of any supposed advantages enjoyed by the defendant by citing the percentage of cases in which the Government
obtains convictions. The evidence does not support this conclusion.
The high percentage of convictions is produced not by unfair advantages possessed by prosecutors, but rather by the careful
screening process which occurs prior to the initiation of a prosecution. The exercise of discretion by prosecutors, particularly in selecting for prosecution only those cases in which there is better than
an even chance of conviction, and the requirements of probable
cause, should and do result in a high percentage of convictions. The
same factors account for the fact that in about ninety per cent of
serious criminal cases the defendants choose to plead guilty. If these
conditions did not exist, the machinery of the courts would be unworkable and our system of criminal justice would fall far short of
its purpose. That purpose, which some academic writers seem to lose
sight of, is to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent by using
procedures fair to both sides; it is not to give defense lawyers a fiftyfifty chance to win acquittal for their clients, whether guilty or
innocent, solely in the interest of making it a more even game.
There are several ways in which these volumes could be made
more useful to the practitioner. The timetable, instead of being
merely an alphabetical index, could list chronologically the steps
which defense counsel should consider and the time allowed for
each of these steps. Also in the index, references should be to specific pages rather than to sections which may run for many pages.
The pocket parts should state the volumes of the reports covered in
each annual edition; the current work seems to go through June
1968 judging from cases and statutes cited, but if the exact volumes
were given the reader would know just what additional ground to
cover. These are at best minuscule imperfections in a treatise of
such monumental proportions in a field where the text is somewhat
dated the minute it is set in type. There is no scholar who can speak
with more authority than Professor Wright. In these three volumes
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his unique experience as a member of the Committee on Rules of
Ptactice atid Ptocedure of the Judicial Conference and the informed
scholarship which has already given us his one-volume work on the
federal courts21 have produced a work which is the single most useful text for anyone concerned with federal criminal justice.
]. Edward Lumbard,
Chief Judge,
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit

Review II
A childhood hymn recites that while strolling in the garden the
voice of God disclosed a joy that none other had ever known. Too
many judges, especially federal appellate judges, seem to feel that
they also possess a special insight that no one else can possibly share.
The extent to which this observation is true marks the dimensions of
the job attempted by Professor Wright. Each month approximately
nine volumes of the Federal Reporter join the shelves. Among these
new volumes a great bulk of pages interpret and reinterpret the
maxims of federal criminal procedure. Often, no reconciliation of
the views expressed in the many opinions is possible. Some seem not
to subscribe to the Supreme Court Reporter; others reflect great
study of the decisions and remarkable ingenuity in evading the plain
precedent of the highest court's decisions.1 For this reason the practitioner must join the legendary dissatisfied of Dean Pound's famous
speech.2 lt is not only the laymen who want some predictability in
law; Ia-wyers as well do not respect intermediate appellate courts
which disregard the opinions of the highest court. In his three volumes Professor Wright wisely makes no attempt to reconcile the
irreconcilable-to tie together the ridiculously divergent opinions
of the various circuits. Instead, he relies principally upon the opinions of the Supreme Court in the areas of controversy. His willingness to do so lends credit and authority to the volumes, and that
stature, together with Professor Wright's personal renown, will contribute to a more uniform federal procedure.
21. C. WRIGHT, FEDElW. COURTS (1963).

I. E.g., U~ited States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, !l69 U.S. 823
(I!l62) trefusal to apply McNabb-Mallory Rule and FED. R. CRiM. P. 5(a)]. When too
many courts refuse to obey, what can the Supreme Court do?
2. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. REP. 895 (1906).
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The volumes do not treat criminal procedure in depth, and
consequently it is even more significant that the principal issues are
discerningly presented. For example, amid the confusion of Miranda3 and the various attempts to circumvent its principles, one
could very easily overlook the crucial fact that the most important
result of the decision is to change the factual qµestions. While the
old "totality of the circumstances" test is still 1:elevant, the questions
now are essentially: (1) Was the suspect given his Miranda warning,
and if so, (2) Did he thereafter waive his privilege? Other questions
obviously remain, but the critical facts in most cases will now revolve around the issue of "waiver." Professor Wright focµses on this
change with precision.
In the same way, the critical nature of discovery is properly em~
phasized. This is the area of criminal law that is in greatest need
of revision. Quite apart from the needless trials which take place
because the defense is ignorant of the strength of the government's
case, innocent people have been prejudiced by the lack of discovery.
For example (ignoring the factual presumption made by many
judges and jurors that, because of the ''reliable" screening afforded
by police and public prosecutors, the ai;:cused would not be in court
if he were not guilty), if an innocent man is accused of having made
a sale of heroin to an 1.1ndercover agent some five months prior to
the date of the complaint, he can hardly develop a legitimate alibi
for a date so far in the past. He must know the precise evidence
against him if he is to expose the false accusation. Yet most avenues
of discovery are closed to him, On the other hand, the absence of
discovery does not significantly hinder the guilty defendant because
he knows the facts. It is only the innocent who suffer. Until discovery is broadened to minimize such anomalous situations, it cannot
be asserted that the dark ages of criminal procedure are past.
Professor Wright wisely avoids some traps for the unwary commentator. The thicket of collateral attacks, for example, and the
resulting congestion in appellate dockets do not lend themselves
readily to summary evaluation, for their expansion has grown unevenly from a need for reform. Until recently, the evils of trial procedure were almost impossible to disturb on a collateral attack. Even
in direct appeals, if the appellant was indigent, the trial judge could
remove the ground for his appeal simply by certifying that the case
involved no substantial question. A few years ago, for instance, I
was appointed counsel for an indigent, and my client's appeal from
the trial court's decision against him was certified frivolous by a
distinguished trial judge. A three-judge panel of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed, and a petition for
rehearing en bane on the question of the frivolity of the appeal was
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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unavailing. The Supreme Court reversed,4 but by the time a panel
of the Circuit Court finally heard the case, the appellant was only a
few months from his "good time" release date. That panel reversed
per curiam without dissent and ordered a judgment of acquittal. 5
When the question involves the prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the accused, the need for a full post-trial hearing
and evaluation becomes even more important. 6 Hence the problems
posed by the multiplicity of collateral attacks do not lend themselves to easy solutions, and Professor Wright does well to avoid an
extended evaluation of those problems.
Nevertheless, the books do not deal adequately with the wealth
of decisional authority; indeed, they could not do so without a tenfold expansion of volumes. Their main defects are (1) the use of the
same format as that in the former volumes7-a format based upon
the federal rules which do not furnish a logical organization for
the problems of criminal procedure; and (2) treatment of all
problems with roughly the same degree of concentration when
certain areas justify greater depth of research and citation. In short,
for the criminal practitioner the volumes present a good place to
start research, but they do not provide the same degree of exhaustive citation that may be found in the companion volumes on civil
procedure. 8 This defect is particularly objectionable in view of the
broad scope of the work. It would have been more logical either to
consider only the basic and most important problems in a few
pages or to treat all the problems in considerable detail. Unfortunately, these volumes do neither. But in light of the massive
amount of decisional materials and the rapidly changing principles,
one must concede the virtual impossibility of such an undertaking.
On the whole, these are books written by an eminent authority,
and, as such, they are certain to be read and relied upon by both
lawyers and judges. Fortunately for the administration of criminal
justice, Professor Wright hits the mark far more frequently than
he misses.
George W. Shadoan,
Member of the Kentucky,
Maryland, and District of
Columbia Bars
4. Kemp v. United States, 369 U.S. 661 (1962) (per curiam).
5. Kemp v. United States, 311 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. See, e.g., Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1961) (over state objection, the
subpoena duces tecum was utilized after trial to discover suppressed evidence).
7. 4
BARRON, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE (1951, Supp. 1968); 4 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT (1964).
8. W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE (C. Wright ed. 1960,
Supp. 1968). One volume of a new treatise on the civil rules, 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE (1969), which, together with the three volumes on
the criminal rules, will replace the older treatise, has been published.
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